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Abstract 
Good’s Theorem is the apparent platitude that it is always rational to ‘look before you leap’: to 
gather (reliable) information before making a decision when doing so is free. We argue that 
Good’s Theorem is not platitudinous and may be false. And we argue that the correct advice is 
rather to ‘make your act depend on the answer to a question’. Looking before you leap is 
rational when, but only when, it is a way to do this. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Good’s Theorem says: look before you leap if looking is free.  
‘Free’ excludes all costs: of money, of time, of opportunity. Good doesn’t say that you 
should observe everything before doing anything; nor that you should pay the monetary cost 
of checking your tax return with every accountant, the temporal cost of reading everything on 
a subject before writing a paper on it, or the opportunity cost of constant dithering. He only 
recommends not choosing until you have learnt what you can learn for free. So qualified, the 
theorem looks platitudinous. ‘Look before you leap’ isn’t always good advice; ‘Look for free 
before you leap’ surely is. 
But there are counterexamples to Good’s Theorem, described and classified here. Since 
Good’s proof is valid, the counterexamples show that his premises are contentious. First 
question: which premises and why? Second question: how close we can get to Good’s Theorem 
without them? – is any genuine platitude within the neighbourhood of ‘look before you leap’? 
We answer both. 
Section 2 presents Good’s proof. Sections 3-4 give two counterexamples and identify 
which premises cause trouble. Section 5 defends ‘Conditionality’ (5.1), which is the best we 
can do whilst avoiding that trouble. Conditionality has two virtues: it follows from Good’s 
uncontroversial assumptions (5.1); and it yields Good’s Theorem as a special case in certain 
environments (5.2).  
 
2 Good’s Theorem 
 
Informally, Good’s Theorem (GT) says  
 
A rational agent will make any available, free and relevant observation before choosing 
an act. 
 2 
 
Before the proof, we make one comment and stress three points. Comment: ‘relevant’ is 
interpreted lightly: an observation is relevant unless the agent is certain that it has no bearing 
on the decision. (The proof also shows that when a free observation isn’t relevant, it is still 
permissible to make it.) 
Three further points: first (as mentioned): calling observation ‘free’ rules out anything 
the agent considers a cost. Second: making the observation is not supposed to affect any event 
on which the success of any available act depends. But third: it may affect the agent’s beliefs 
about these events—that’s the point.  
Good’s ([1967]) proof uses standard (i.e. Savage’s) decision theory and standard (i.e. 
Bayesian) formal epistemology. Specifically, Good assumes that rational agents (a) have 
preferences that maximize expected utility and choose in accordance with these preferences, 
and (b) update by conditionalization. Before stating (a) and (b) we outline their background: 
not because it plays a role in Good’s proof, but because we must relax it if (as we argue) there 
is reason to dilute GT.      
We have a set W of possible worlds (assumed, for simplicity, to be finite) and a set Z 
of possible outcomes or payoffs (identified, for simplicity, with dollar credits and debits, so 
that Z is a set of real numbers). The ‘act space’ A then contains all functions from W to Z i.e. 
A=def.ZW. An act a Î A specifies a ‘prize’ a (w) in each world w. An ‘event’ or ‘proposition’ is 
a subset of W. If h is a proposition, and a (w1) = a (w2) whenever w1, w2 Î h, we define 
a (h) as a (w) for any w Î h. So a gamble paying $1 if this coin lands heads (h1) and losing $1 
otherwise (h2) is the act a such that a (h1) = 1 and a (h2) = -1.  
Classical decision theory says that for a1, a2 Î A, a rational agent’s preference satisfies: 
 𝐸𝑈(𝑎) =def. ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ)𝑎(ℎ)+∈- 1  𝑎/ ≻ 𝑎1	iff 𝐸𝑈(𝑎/) > 𝐸𝑈(𝑎1)  
 
‘a1 ! a2’ means the agent strictly prefers a1 to a2 (so always chooses a1 when a2 is the only 
alternative). Similarly ‘a1 ! a2’ means ~(a2 ! a1): the agent ‘weakly prefers’ a1 to a2. EU (a) is 
the expected utility of a. It is a weighted average of the returns to a in the events h1, h2, …hn 
(chosen so that a (w1) = a (w2) whenever w1, w2 Î hi), the weight for hi being Cr (hi). Cr is the 
agent’s ‘credence’: a probability function mapping a proposition to the confidence the agent 
assigns to that proposition. It follows that given a menu M of acts (M Í A), her expectation of 
utility when facing M with belief state Cr is: 
 
(1) 𝐸𝑈(𝑀,𝐶𝑟) =def. max:∈; ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-  
 
Thus suppose you are choosing whether to bet $1 on Red Rum: winning makes a profit 
of $1. Let h1 be the proposition that (that is, the set of possible worlds at which) Red Rum wins 
and h2 the proposition that he doesn’t. The available acts are then as follow: 
  
 h1: RR wins h2: RR doesn’t win 
a1: bet 1 -1 
a2: no bet 0 0 
Table 1: Red Rum 
 
                                                        
1 We assume that the agent has increasing linear utility for money. Nothing turns on this.   
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a1 and a2 are functions from {h1, h2} to Z = {-1, 0, 1} s.t. a1 (h1) = 1, a1 (h2) = -1, a2 (h1) = a2 
(h2) = 0.  
The expected utility of a1 is 𝐶𝑟(ℎ/) − 𝐶𝑟(ℎ1), which is 2𝐶𝑟(ℎ/) − 1 since 𝐶𝑟(ℎ/) +𝐶𝑟(ℎ1) = 1. The expected utility of a2 is 0. Since you pick whichever act has higher EU, the 
expected utility of choosing from {a1, a2} is:  
 𝐸𝑈({𝑎/, 𝑎1}, 𝐶𝑟)=max {0, 2𝐶𝑟(ℎ/) − 1}.  
 
So much for the background decision theory.  
Call a set of propositions P = {p1, p2, … pm} a ‘partition’ if those propositions are 
mutually exclusive (i ≠ j « pi Ç pj = Æ) and jointly exhaustive (ÈP = W). Now suppose that 
before choosing you have the option to learn which element of a partition P is true—that is, 
you can do what Good calls ‘making an observation’ that settles P. (Since P partitions W, 
exactly one element of P is true.) As Bayesians, we assume that upon observation you update 
your beliefs Cr by conditionalization: if you learn that p Î P is true, where Cr (p) > 0, then 
your credence shifts from Cr to a new probability function 𝐶𝑟B, defined on an arbitrary 
proposition ℎ as follows: 
  𝐶𝑟B(ℎ) = 𝐶𝑟(ℎ|𝑝) =def. EF(+B)EF(B)   
 
(We’ll sometimes write ℎ𝑝	for	ℎ ∩ 𝑝.) 𝐶𝑟(ℎ|𝑝) is the ‘conditional probability’ of h given p. So 
much for the background epistemology.  
Suppose you observe before choosing and learn p. Given your new credence function 
Crp you now choose a Î M maximizing: 
 𝐸𝑈(𝑎|𝑝) = ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ|𝑝)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-      
 
If observing means learning which p Î P is true, the ex ante expected utility of observation is: 
 
(2) ∑ 𝐶𝑟(𝑝)𝐸𝑈H𝑀, 𝐶𝑟BIB∈J = ∑ 𝐶𝑟(𝑝)max:∈; ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ|𝑝)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-B∈J  
 
Given that a rational person maximizes expected utility, it follows from (1) and (2) that GT 
holds if this inequality does: 
 ∑ 𝐶𝑟(𝑝)max:∈; ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ|𝑝)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-B∈J ≥ max:∈; ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-   
 
By definition of 𝐶𝑟(ℎ|𝑝), this is equivalent to: 
 
(3) ∑ max:∈; ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ𝑝)𝑎(ℎ) ≥ max:∈; ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-+∈-B∈J   
 
Good proves GT by proving (3).  
To get a feeling for how, consider this analogy. The US government faces a menu M of 
nationwide tax regimes that each assigns a fixed rate to each economic class, where individuals 
occupy the same class if and only if they have the same gross income. The regimes typically 
have different effects on different classes. The government aims to maximize net income 
aggregated across all individuals. Equivalently, it aims to maximize the weighted sum of net 
incomes earnt by each class, where the weight of a class is the proportion of individuals within 
it.    
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As well as partitioning the population into economic classes, we can partition it into 
States. Suppose every individual resides in exactly one State. So each tax regime has 
implications for the income of each State i.e. the aggregate income of its residents. We number 
the regimes alphabetically by State, so that a1 Î M is by this measure the optimal regime for 
Alabama, a2 for Alaska, … a50 is optimal for Wyoming. (Maybe ai = aj for some i ¹ j.)  
 Now instead of a single tax regime applied across all States, imagine a scheme as that 
varies the regime across States as follows: it applies a1 in Alabama, a2 in Alaska, … a50 in 
Wyoming. Then (3) is saying that as is at least as good, by the government’s measure, as any 
a Î M. Good’s argument for this is that as is at least as good as a in each State. as is at least as 
good as a in Alabama, because as implements a1 in Alabama, which is optimal in M for 
Alabama, etc. Since the weighted sum of incomes in any State is at least as high under as as 
under any a Î M, and since everyone resides in exactly one State, the sum of all incomes, and 
hence the weighted sum of class earnings, is at least as high under as as under any a Î M. 
Citizens correspond to worlds, income classes to events h Î H, States to observations 
p Î P, populations—of classes and States—to credence, and the original menu of uniform tax 
regimes to your options. Specifically, for a class h, a State p and a tax regime a, the number of 
individuals in that class in that State corresponds to Cr (hp), the number of individuals in that 
class across the US to Cr (h), and the net income under a of anyone in that class to a (h).  
The intuitive story translates into a literal proof of (3). Since 𝐶𝑟(ℎ) = ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ𝑝)B∈J , 
the right-hand side of (3) is: 
 
(4) max:∈; ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ𝑝)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-B∈J 2 
 
But ‘the sum of the maxima exceeds the maximum of the sums’. (4) chooses a single 𝑎 ∈ 𝑀, 
call it	𝑎∗, that maximizes ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ𝑝)𝑎(ℎ)+∈-B∈J . But the left-hand side of (3) chooses, for 
each 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, an 𝑎B ∈ 𝑀 that maximizes ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ𝑝)𝑎(ℎ)+∈- . So if 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 then ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ𝑝)𝑎B(ℎ)+∈- ≥ ∑ 𝐶𝑟(ℎ𝑝)𝑎∗(ℎ)+∈- ; (3) follows.  
Let’s apply this to Red Rum. Before choosing whether to bet you can listen—for free—
to a tip. This has two possible outcomes: the tipster forecasts either (p1) that Red Rum wins or 
(p2) that he loses. The forecast needn’t be reliable in your opinion; but you have some opinion 
about its reliability. Suppose you think a win has probability x if forecast and y if not. So 𝐶𝑟(ℎ/|𝑝/) = 𝑥 and 𝐶𝑟(ℎ/|𝑝1) = 𝑦. Since the forecast is free, your payoffs in this new 
problem—Red Rum*—are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 h1p1: forecast 
win, win 
h2p1: forecast 
win, loss 
h1p2: forecast 
loss, win 
h2p2: forecast 
loss, loss 
a1: bet 1 -1 1 -1 
a2: no bet 0 0 0 0 
a3: listen 
to tip 
1 if x > 0.5 
0 if x ≤ 0.5 
-1 if x > 0.5 
0 if x ≤ 0.5 
1 if y > 0.5 
0 if y ≤ 0.5 
-1 if y > 0.5 
0 if y ≤ 0.5 
Table 2: Red Rum*  
                                                        
2 Using ∑ ∑ 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∑ ∑ 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)Q∈RS∈TS∈TQ∈R . 
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The expected utilities are:  
 
(5) 𝐸𝑈(𝑎/) = 2𝐶𝑟(ℎ/) − 1 
(6) 𝐸𝑈(𝑎1) = 0 
(7) 𝐸𝑈(𝑎U) = 𝐶𝑟(𝑝/)max {2𝑥 − 1, 0} + 𝐶𝑟(𝑝1)max {2𝑦 − 1, 0} 
 
Now 2𝐶𝑟(ℎ/) − 1 = 𝐶𝑟(𝑝/)(2𝑥 − 1) + 𝐶𝑟(𝑝1)(2𝑦 − 1). So (7) ≥ (5), (6) for any x, y. It’s 
always rational to listen: doing so can’t worsen but can improve things, in expectation.3  So 
much for Good’s Theorem.  
 
 
3 Inexact observation 
 
GT is intuitive and its proof is simple. So counterexamples are interesting. The first, using a 
case suggested—for different purposes—by (Williamson [2011]), is as follows. 
You are facing an unmarked clock with a single digit that can point in any of 60 
uniformly separated directions that we (but not the clock) label 0 to 59. Your discrimination of 
where the digit is pointing is limited; to be reliable in your judgment you must leave a margin 
of error. If the digit is in fact pointing at 53, you can reliably judge that it is pointing between 
52 and 54 inclusive, but you are unreliable about stronger claims. Similarly for every other 
position.4 
 Plausibly, your evidence is the strongest claim you can reliably get right. This means 
that the maximal propositions you learn in the various scenarios overlap. Let D be the digit’s 
true direction. If 𝐷 = 53, your evidence is that 𝐷 ∈ {52,53,54}. If 𝐷 = 52, it is that 𝐷 ∈{51,52,53}. Each scenario yields evidence compatible with the other. But they yield different 
evidence. 
 Call a world w2 accessible from w1 if your evidence in w1 is consistent with w2. 
Accessibility is not transitive. 𝐷 = 53 is consistent with the evidence from looking if 𝐷 = 52. 𝐷 = 54  is consistent with the evidence if 𝐷 = 53. But 𝐷 = 54 is not consistent with the 
evidence if 𝐷 = 52. More generally the situation is as in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Accessibility relations on an unmarked clock 
Examples like this have been widely discussed in epistemology.5 They are interesting 
because they show how one might receive evidence without knowing that this is the evidence 
one received. When (say) 𝐷 = 52, your evidence is that 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53}. But if 𝐷 = 53, which 
is consistent with what you learned (namely with 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53}), your evidence would have 
                                                        
3 GT does not say that you will actually do better by listening. The tip might mislead. GT says that listening is 
better ‘in expectation’, from the perspective of your ex ante credence.  
4 In reality, it’s presumably vague what margins suffice for your judgments to count as ‘reliable’. But the problem 
arises for any fixed size of the margin above a certain lower bound; hence it arises on both epistemic and 
supervaluational approaches.     
5 (Williamson [1992]) first defends cases with roughly this structure. Much of the responding literature focuses 
on knowledge, rather than evidence. Exceptions include (Christensen [2010]; Elga [2013]; Horowitz [2014]), 
which sympathetically discuss the above description. (Cohen and Comesaña [2013]) builds on (Stalnaker [2009], 
pp. 405-6) to develop an alternative formal treatment, which— when applied to the clock—would make the case 
consistent with GT. (Hawthorne and Magidor [2009]) and (Williamson [2013], pp. 80-3) criticize this alternative. 
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been that 𝐷 ∈ {52,53,54}. So, while your evidence is that 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53}, you do not know 
this.6 If you did know this, you could combine it with your knowledge of the setup to infer that 𝐷 = 52, since that is the only case in which you get this evidence. But it’s implausible that you 
could learn something this exact from looking at the clock—even if you did know the setup. 
While widely discussed in epistemology, there has been little discussion of how such 
cases bear on decision theory, specifically on Good’s Theorem.7 Yet they do. Let O say that 
the digit is pointing at an odd number; E that it is pointing at an even number (calling 0 even). 
And suppose you haven’t looked at the clock yet, but know that if you do, you will 
conditionalize on what you learn.8 Then by your own lights ex ante, looking is misleading 
regarding O and E.9 Suppose O, say 𝐷 = 53. Then looking rules out all possibilities except 
that and the ‘adjacent’ ones 𝐷 = 52 and 𝐷 = 54. Of these, two are in E and one is in O. So 
your evidence supports E.10 Similarly, if E is true, looking will support O. 
This fact—that, by your own lights ex ante, looking is misleading—creates failures of 
GT. Suppose you are offered two bets. ODD costs 60¢ and pays $1 if O. EVEN costs 60¢ and 
pays $1 if E. You can take either or neither now, or you can look at the clock before deciding. 
Then you should think it a bad idea to look. Your evidence now supports not betting. Suppose 
you look before deciding. If D is odd, your evidence will support E to degree 0.67, making it 
rational to buy only the losing bet EVEN. If D is even, the evidence will make it rational to 
buy only the losing bet ODD. Either way, you pay 60¢ for a losing bet if you look first. You 
know all this beforehand. So you know that it’s a bad idea to look first. 
This can seem puzzling. You know throughout that: 
  
(8) Your evidence on looking is 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53} iff 𝐷 = 52	iff ODD is a losing bet. 
 
Why, then, do you pay for ODD upon receiving 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53}? The answer is just what 
makes this case epistemologically interesting. Receiving 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53} does not tell you that 
you received 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53}. So, upon receiving 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53}, you cannot apply modus 
ponens to (8) to conclude that ODD is a losing bet. Once we understand this crucial, but 
surprising, feature of the example, the puzzle disappears. 
 
                                                        
6 All you know about your evidence is that it is either 𝐷 ∈ {50,51,52} or 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53} or 𝐷 ∈ {52,53,54}. 
7 Though see (Das [unpublished)]) and (Dorst [unpublished]). Other related literature differs in focus. 
(Geanakoplos [1989]) shows that failures of Good’s Theorem arise from imperfections in the processing of 
partitional observation: taking a signal at face-value, forgetfulness, wishful thinking, doxastic obstinacy or failures 
of imagination. By contrast, we argue that observation of the unmarked clock is itself non-partitional, which 
undermines GT even for agents lacking all those imperfections. (Williamson [2000], pp. 230-7) discusses non-
partitional observation and its relevance to decision theory, but focuses on exploitability. Bronfman ([2014]) and 
Schoenfield ([forthcoming]) argue that these cases make conditionalization non-accuracy-maximizing. They are 
opposing the epistemic optimality of processing information in the usual way; we are opposing (and Good is 
defending) the pragmatic optimality of seeking information in the first place. 
The literature also discusses how imprecise probabilities bear on Good’s Theorem: Good ([1974]) 
himself raises this worry, attributing it to Isaac Levi and Teddy Seidenfeld; (Seidenfeld [2004]) and (Bradley and 
Steele [2016]) discuss it in detail. However, imprecise probabilities and inexact observations raise different issues. 
Inexact observation, as described above, is consistent with the relevant probability distribution’s assigning to each 
proposition a single real number, hence consistent with standard expected utility theory. By contrast, imprecise 
probabilities violate standard expected utility theory. Counterexamples to GT that arise from such imprecision are 
thus more like our second type of counterexample; see note 23 below. 
8 This assumption, that you know ex ante that you are a Bayesian, is essential. But it is one that Good himself both 
makes and needs: without it we lose motivation for (2), which is crucial to Good’s proof. So if our example 
undermines the assumption, it leaves Good with problems as serious as—though admittedly quite different from—
those we want to raise.  
9 Compare (Horowitz [2014], pp. 735-740), which tentatively defends this feature of the example. 
10 At least if, as we can assume, your initial distribution is uniform i.e. 𝐶𝑟(𝐷 = 𝑥) = 1/60 if 𝑥 = 0,1,…59.  
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We’ll discuss three objections. The first two arise from the fact that, according to our 
description of the case, it allows you to receive evidence without knowing that you have 
received it. 
First Objection. This shows that we have misdescribed the example. You can always 
tell what your evidence is; so the evidence can’t be as we claimed. 
Response. It’s natural to think you can always tell what your evidence is. It’s also 
natural to think that your evidence when looking at an unmarked clock is as we said it was. 
The two conflict. Clearly, we cannot resolve this conflict here. 
However, we do not need to. If the debates about inexact perception have taught us 
anything, it’s that it isn’t obvious what to say—and hence not obvious that the case does not 
work as we say. This suffices for our puzzle. GT is supposed to be a platitude. If it depends on 
a far-from-obvious claim about how inexact perception works, it isn’t one. 
Second Objection. Grant that our description of your evidence is correct: you receive 
evidence without knowing that you received it. But then how can it influence you? The 
argument against Good took for granted that (you know ex ante that) if you look at the clock 
then your choice will maximize EU relative to the credence you then acquire. That assumption 
was needed to argue (n. 8) that you will buy the losing bet if you look. But why think you will 
maximize EU relative to that credence function if looking leaves open what it is? 
 Response. This objection assumes that to act on a belief you must know what it is.11 
The underlying picture of practical rationality is this: the EU-maximizer surveys her credences 
and utilities, compares the EU of her options, and chooses one that scores highest.  
This picture is wrong. ‘Practical rationality’ doesn’t constrain how an agent chooses in 
light of her beliefs and desires, but only what choices she makes given that she does in fact 
have those beliefs and desires. In particular, we want to evaluate the choices of creatures who 
don’t know that they have beliefs, let alone what they are. Chrysippus’ dog, faced with three 
paths, set off down path C after smelling that its quarry was not on paths A or B. We want to 
say the dog acted rationally; given its belief that the quarry was on path C, it would have been 
irrational to set off down path A. But the dog does not know it has this belief. So we cannot 
say this if practical rationality requires doxastic self-knowledge. (Similarly, eliminativists in 
the philosophy of mind deny that anyone has beliefs, so cannot know the contents of their own; 
this does not protect them from charges of practical irrationality.)        
 
The third objection grants the overall structure of the case, but challenges the details. 
Third Objection. Grant that looking eliminates values far from D and leaves open close 
ones. It doesn’t follow that you distribute credence uniformly over the remaining possibilities. 
More likely you concentrate on central values within the range of still-live possibilities. So a 
glance when 𝐷 = 52 might shift you to some 𝐶𝑟∗ satisfying: 
 
(9) 𝐶𝑟∗(𝐷 = 51) = 0.1 
(10) 𝐶𝑟∗(𝐷 = 52) = 0.8 
(11) 𝐶𝑟∗(𝐷 = 53) = 0.1 
 
                                                        
11 A less demanding version of the objection says only that you must know at each point what your preferences 
are. This rules out the particular case (where you won’t know your preferences after looking), but not natural 
variants. Imagine that you’ll get to see the hand for slightly longer when it’s pointing at an odd number, so that in 
those cases you can reliably detect its exact position—but the added time is short enough that you can’t detect 
whether you’ve been given it. Then you know beforehand that looking will give you evidence that the number is 
odd (raising its probability to 1 if it is, or .67, if not), so that your later preference will be to bet ODD whatever 
you learned. So you’ll also know, after looking, that you then prefer to bet ODD. But your ex ante evaluation of 
looking, hence buying ODD, is still negative: the .5 chance of losing 60¢ outweighs the .5 chance of winning 40¢. 
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But 𝐶𝑟∗ will prompt you to bet EVEN. Generally, if looking makes your credence as sharply 
peaked as 𝐶𝑟∗ about the centre of its support, then looking is a good idea ex ante.12   
Response. Grant that a glance adjusts your credence to some 𝐶𝑟∗ symmetric about and 
modal at the true value of D, and not uniform over its support. Still, if 𝐶𝑟∗ is ‘close enough’ to 
uniform, then our problem still arises given adjusted charges for the bets. 
Let [j] be the proposition that 𝐷	 = 	𝑗	𝑚𝑜𝑑	60; and let 𝐶𝑟∗	([𝑖]) 	= 	𝑥 and 𝐶𝑟∗([𝑖 − 1]) = 𝐶𝑟∗([𝑖 + 1]) = 𝑦 if in fact D = i. Since we can pick the distance between the 
positions as we like, there’s no harm in assuming that 𝐶𝑟∗([𝑖 − 1] ∪ [𝑖] ∪ [𝑖 + 1]) = 1, so that 
x + 2y = 1. We can reprice the bets ODD and EVEN at $𝑐. Then, as long as 0.5 < 𝑐 < 2𝑦, 
looking at the clock motivates taking (only) the losing bet on its position. Such a 𝑐 exists 
whenever 𝑦 > .25. 
 Glancing may shift your credence to a distribution violating these conditions—like (9)-
(11)—and then the example creates no trouble for GT, whatever the charge on each bet. But 
why must it? It is easy to imagine evidence to the contrary. Suppose that you are repeatedly 
forced to guess D at a glance: you are right one time in three and never out by more than 1. If 
we like we can build this into the case.  
 It might seem strange that when 𝐷	 = 	𝑖, 𝐶𝑟∗	([𝑖 + 1]) and 𝐶𝑟∗	([𝑖 − 1]) both exceed 
0.25 and 𝐶𝑟∗([𝑖 + 2]) and 𝐶𝑟∗([𝑖 − 2]) are both zero, since then the probability that the digit 
is pointing at j does not decrease linearly to zero with the angular distance between j and i, but 
rather more quickly as we get further from i. But this is not so implausible. Suppose you have 
visual receptors corresponding to each second of arc on the clock-face. When you look at the 
clock and D = d*, visual receptors fire at a rate that is normally distributed about the true 
position: those corresponding to a position z seconds of arc away from d* fire at a rate 
proportional to 𝑒jkl ml⁄ for some constant 𝜎. And suppose that looking rules out a position if 
and only if the receptors corresponding to that position fire at a rate below some threshold D > 
0. Then 𝐶𝑟∗	(𝐷	 = 	𝑥) will fall first gently and then sharply – that is, non-linearly – towards 
zero as |𝑥 − 𝑑∗| increases, just as in our model. 
Again, we needn’t show that our problem case actually arises, only that it would in 
circumstances that are neither ruled out a priori nor excluded from the intuitive principle (‘look 
before you leap’). 𝑦 > 0.25 meets those conditions: nobody ever took GT to hold only if 
perception doesn’t work like that. It is hardly platitudinous that it doesn’t. Neither therefore is 
Good’s Theorem itself.  
 
Where does Good’s proof go wrong, then? Good identifies ‘making an observation’ 
with learning exactly which element of some partition is true: specifically, it assumes you are 
certain ex ante that the maximal proposition learnt by observation is inconsistent with any other 
maximal proposition you might learn by observation. Without this, there is no reason why (2) 
should represent the expected utility of observing. 
 Our example exhibits observations for which no partition P is such that you are certain 
ex ante that making the observation teaches you exactly which p Î P is true. 𝐷 ∈ {51, 52, 53} 
                                                        
12 That you shift to Cr* is inconsistent with simple Bayesian updating on 𝐷 ∈ {51,52,53} given a uniform prior. 
A natural model of the shift is Jeffrey conditionalization (Jeffrey [1983], pp. 164ff.). The idea is that perception 
‘directly’ adjusts your confidence in certain propositions (‘This cloth is green’, ‘𝐷 = 52’) within the open interval 
(0, 1). If perception changes your Cr by directly adjusting your credences in X1, … Xn respectively to Cr* (Xi), 
then its indirect impact on your credence is given by 𝐶𝑟∗(𝑌) = ∑ 𝐶𝑟(𝑌|𝑋r)𝐶𝑟∗(𝑋r)srt/  for any Y in the algebra. 
Good assumes ordinary conditionalization; (Graves [1989]) generalizes the argument to Jeffrey 
conditionalization. Our example shows that, much as Good’s argument requires an objectionably narrow 
definition of ‘making an observation’, such generalizations require an objectionably narrow view of what makes 
a Jeffrey shift a ‘genuine learning experience’. 
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and 𝐷 ∈ 	 {52, 53, 54} are both propositions that might exhaust what you learn by looking; but 
they are consistent, since both hold if 𝐷 = 52. 
So the problem is not that Good’s premises fail to entail his conclusion, but that they 
understand ‘observation’ too narrowly. Without this narrow understanding, there is no 
guarantee that a policy that adjusts one’s bet to the contents of the observation will do at least 
as well ‘in expectation’ as taking whatever bet looks optimal ex ante.13 Good’s proof does not 
apply to anyone whose observations are inexact. And it’s no platitude that there aren’t—much 
less couldn’t be—people like that.  
 
 
4 Independence 
 
The second counterexample is better known: we present it more briefly.14 Let h1, h2 and h3 
partition W and let gambles a1-a4 on these events give you terminal wealth (in millions of 
dollars) as specified below: 
 
 h1 h2 h3 
a1 0 5 0 
a2 1 1 0 
a3 0 5 1 
a4 1 1 1 
Table 3: Allais  
 
It follows from EU-maximization that a rational wealth-lover prefers a1 (a2) from 𝑀/1 ={𝑎/, 𝑎1} if and only if she prefers a3 (a4) from 𝑀Uu = {𝑎U, 𝑎u}.15 That is: a1 ! a2 iff a3 ! a4 and 
a1  ! a2 iff a3 ! a4.   
 That is descriptively false. If h1 says that in a fair lottery over [1, 100] the integer drawn 
is 1, h2 that it lies in [2, 11] and h3 that it lies in [12, 100], most people have 𝑎1 ! a2 and a4 ! 
a3. This is the Allais paradox.16  
That descriptive mismatch may be normatively irrelevant. But allow—following some 
decision theorists—that these widespread ‘Allais preferences’ are rationally permissible. Now 
suppose you face M12 and M34 on separate occasions: the draws are independent and you may 
choose on either occasion without reference to the other. Before betting in each case, you can 
make an observation P that teaches you one of two things: 
 𝑝/ = ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1  𝑝1 = ℎU  
 
Think of P as gathering incomplete but accurate information about the draw: conducting P tells 
you exactly whether the chosen integer exceeds 11.  
                                                        
13 Partitionality is not necessary for GT: (Geanakoplos [1989]) and (Dorst [unpublished]) identify weaker 
conditions that suffice. But since such conditions still rule out intuitive examples like the clock, it’s no more 
obvious that observation obeys them than that it is partitional. 
14 For discussion, see (Buchak [2010]). 
15 𝐸𝑈(𝑎U) − 𝐸𝑈(𝑎/) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑎u) − 𝐸𝑈(𝑎1), so 𝐸𝑈(𝑎/) > 𝐸𝑈(𝑎1) iff 𝐸𝑈(𝑎U) > 𝐸𝑈(𝑎u) and 𝐸𝑈(𝑎/) ≥ 𝐸𝑈(𝑎1) 
iff 𝐸𝑈(𝑎U) ≥ 𝐸𝑈(𝑎u).  
16 (Allais [1953]). 
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 Should you observe P? It seems that if ex ante you prefer 𝑎1 to 𝑎2 and 𝑎4 to 𝑎3, and know 
you will choose rationally after observing,17 then in at least one situation you should not. 
Suppose first that you learn p1. Then you are indifferent between 𝑎1 and 𝑎3: those gambles only 
differ in the event (h3) that your observation rules out; similarly, you are indifferent between 𝑎2 and 𝑎4. So on learning p1, you have 𝑎1 ! 𝑎2 iff 𝑎3 ! 𝑎4, and 𝑎1 ! 𝑎2 iff 𝑎3	! 𝑎4, given that ! is 
transitive. So, in either M12 or M34, you are at least open to choosing what you initially reject.18 
Or, suppose you learn p2. Now you are indifferent between 𝑎1 and 𝑎2, since they assign h3 to 
the same payoff; and between 𝑎3	and 𝑎4 for the same reason. So in both cases, learning p2 makes 
you indifferent between your options.  
So either in M12 or in M34 it will seem ex ante counterproductive to conduct the 
observation P: whatever you learn will make you open to the option that you now reject, with 
no compensation. Your position ex ante therefore violates GT.  
We can put it in terms of our taxation analogy. Suppose the government cares not only 
about the aggregate but also about the distributional effects of tax. Specifically, it marginally 
prefers tax schemes that make income more equal. Suppose three economic classes, h1, h2 and 
h3, and four tax regimes a1, a2, a3 and a4, with net incomes of each class as in Table 3. Then 
the government may prefer a1 to a2 but a4 to a3, because the equality under a4 more than 
compensates for its loss of income relative to a3; whereas the equality under a2, being 
imperfect, does not compensate for its loss of income relative to a1.   
Suppose now that the entire US population lives in two States: all those in classes h1 or 
h2 in Alabama, and all those in class h3 in Wyoming. And suppose the government is choosing 
between two tax regimes, say a1 and a2. Then Good’s recommendation is effectively to apply 
in each State the regime that is—by the government’s lights—optimal for that State. This may 
not yield a result that is at least as good—by those lights—as whichever of a1 and a2 is preferred 
overall. Optimizing on a State-by-State basis ignores the distributional effects across States 
that made a4 overall preferable to a3.  
Returning from the analogy: if the agent marginally disprefers variability in gambles, 
then the compound gamble, that realizes in each event in a partition the optimal gamble for that 
event, might look sub-optimal ex ante precisely because it ignores her aversion to cross-event 
variability.    
This counterexample differs significantly from the last. The ‘clock’ objection grants (i) 
that one should learn, before choosing, which element of a partition is true, but denies (ii) that 
looking is always a way to do that. The Allais-based objection attacks (i). The Allais subject 
should find it irrational to learn, before choosing from (say) M12, which of {ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1, ℎU} is true. 
Both objections oppose literally looking before leaping; but here that is a side-effect of denying 
that you should learn from a partition before leaping. 
The Allais case highlights Good’s reliance on a decision theory that prohibits Allais 
preferences. What does this in the classical theory is: 
 
Independence Axiom (IA): Let 𝑎/, 𝑎1, 𝑎U, 𝑎u	be acts and let {ℎ, ℎ∗} partition W. 
Suppose: 
(i) 𝑎/(𝑤) = 𝑎U(𝑤) and 𝑎1(𝑤) = 𝑎u(𝑤) for each 𝑤 ∈ ℎ 
(ii) 𝑎/(𝑤) = 𝑎1(𝑤) and 𝑎U(𝑤) = 𝑎u(𝑤) for each 𝑤 ∈ ℎ∗  
                                                        
17 See analogous comments on an analogous assumption at n. 8 above. 
18 Indifference between a1 and a3 means a1 ! a3 and a3 ! a1; similarly for a2 and a4. So after you learn p1: if a1 ! 
a2, then a3 ! a1 ! a2 ! a4; so if a4 ! a3 then a2 ! a1 by the transitivity of !, contradicting a1 ! a2. Hence if a1 ! a2 
then a3 ! a4. The converse is provable in the same way: hence after you have learnt p1 you must have a1 ! a2 iff 
a3 ! a4. Similarly if a1 ! a2 then a3 ! a1 ! a2 ! a4; so a3 ! a4 by the transitivity of !.  Again the converse is 
provable in the same way: hence after you have learnt p1 you must have a1 ! a2 iff a3 ! a4.    
 11 
Then 𝑎/ ≻ 𝑎1 iff 𝑎U ≻ 𝑎u19 
 
Intuitively: a rational person who prefers (say) lottery ticket L1 over L2 should prefer any bet 
with prize L1 to any with prize L2 but the same downside. It is easy to see why IA prohibits 
Allais preferences: putting ℎ = ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1 and ℎ∗ = ℎU, IA implies both 𝑎1 ≻ 𝑎1 ↔ 𝑎U ≻ 𝑎u and 
a1 ! a2 « a3 ! a4, with a1-a4 as in Table 3. 
 Since the Allais preferences look reasonable, it’s not immediately obvious that 
rationality demands Independence. It’s also not obvious on reflection. EU-maximization 
implies that anyone who (i) has concave utility for money and (ii) always declines a 50/50 bet 
that wins $110 or loses $100 should (iii) decline a 50/50 bet that wins $x or loses $1000, for 
arbitrarily large x.20 This oddity arises from IA. Moreover, plausible alternatives exist: many 
versions of decision theory, by dispensing with IA, permit Allais preferences21, and some are 
appealing not (only) descriptively but as standards of rationality.22 So it isn’t as though 
abandoning IA leaves no concept of practical rationality at all. And the possibility of 
abandoning it leaves GT looking shakier than it did.23 
Still, there are well-known pragmatic arguments for IA. They typically infer the 
rationality of IA from the premise that violating it leaves one open to exploitation.24 Suppose 
that you start out with a1 ! a2, a4 ! a3, but if you learn p1 then you have a3 ! a4. A cunning 
bookie offers a choice between (a) choosing from a3 and a4 after learning which of {p1, p2} is 
true and (b) paying $1 to choose without first learning this. You know that on (a), whatever 
you learn, your choice will make you worse off (by your own lights ex ante) if it makes any 
difference. So you choose (b) and a4. So you are paying $1 for a4 when you could have had 
that gamble for free. Your violating IA is what makes you thus exploitable. Hence, it is argued, 
rationality demands IA. And we might conclude that it’s both harmless and unsurprising that 
dropping it puts you beyond the scope of Good’s Theorem.   
Various responses exist. Some reject the premise. There are, they point out, no cunning 
bookies who know your preferences and can demand payment to withhold information. And if 
there were you’d be sure to avoid them. So this ‘pragmatic’ difficulty with Allais preferences 
is hardly real.25  
Others reject the validity of the argument. Some say that by choosing (b) and then a4, 
you are not really throwing away $1, since the option of ‘a4 for free’ was never genuinely 
available. You knew in advance that if you were to choose (a) then, whatever you learn about 
p1 and p2, you would not take the gamble a4 (unless it made no difference).26 More radically, 
some say that practical rationality constrains your time-slices, not your temporally extended 
                                                        
19 Many, such as (Peterson [2009], p. 99), treat IA as a single axiom; in Savage’s original presentation its content 
is spread across his definition D1 and postulate P2. (See the endpapers of Savage [1972]; cf. pp. 21-3.)     
20 (Rabin [2000]). For other criticisms see (Hansson [1988], pp. 149-51; McClennen [1990], pp. 77-80).  
21 These include: Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]), Anticipated Utility Theory (Quiggin [1982]), 
Generalized EU Analysis (Machina [1982]), Disappointment Theory (Loomes and Sugden [1986]), Choquet EU 
Theory (Schmeidler [1989]), Risk-Weighted EU Theory (Buchak [2013]), and Counterfactual Desirability Theory 
(Bradley and Stefánsson [forthcoming]). 
22 See especially (McClennen [1990]) and (Buchak [2013]). A complication: the Allais case violates GT only if 
we’re right that rational agents use ‘sophisticated choice’ when faced with sequential decision problems; 
McClennen denies, and Buchak entertains denying, this. 
23 These worries about IA depend on the rationality of a form of risk-avoidance not permitted by classical decision 
theory. Many decision theories designed for imprecise probabilities also invalidate IA and, for that reason, also 
generate counterexamples to GT. Other decision theories for imprecise probabilities validate IA and may allow a 
weak version of GT. See (Seidenfeld [2004]) and (Bradley and Steele [2016]) for discussion. 
24 For a summary of such arguments see (Machina [1989], pp. 1636-8) and (Buchak [2013], pp. 170-3).  
25 (Christensen [2004], p. 110). See also (Lewis [1999], p. 133). 
26 (Rabinowicz [1995]); (Buchak [2013], pp. 189-90). 
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self.27 Just as the Pareto inefficiency of the Prisoners’ Dilemma equilibrium is consistent with 
both players’ rationality, so the diachronic exploitability of the Allais subject is consistent with 
her time slices’ rationality. There is nothing else to count as irrational. 
But, setting aside exploitation, someone might argue for IA as follows. It is 
independently plausible that you should learn from a partition (whether or not you must pay 
not to). But violation of IA implies that you’d avoid doing that. So we can defend IA on the 
basis of something like GT itself.  
But, having set exploitation aside, is it obvious, independently of an antecedent 
commitment to IA, that practical rationality demands uptake of free evidence? Clearly, learning 
will improve your anticipated return from bets on propositions which the evidence settles 
conclusively. But what about bets on a proposition p which the evidence doesn’t settle 
conclusively? The evidence may move your credence in p closer to the truth (if, say, it is 
evidence for p, and p is true), but it may also move your credence further from the truth (if, 
say, it is evidence for p, but p is false). In the first case, it will increase your returns; in the 
latter, it will decrease them. So a little learning carries risks. Classical decision theory says that 
the potential benefits always outweigh this risk; but theories which reject IA because of its 
incompatibility with intuitive risk-avoidance may well reach a different verdict. So the 
attractiveness of free evidence is not a neutral starting-point from which to launch an argument 
for IA.28 
These responses to the arguments for IA are not decisive. We don’t mean to endorse 
them. Nor, more generally, do we take a stand on whether IA is rationally compulsory. We 
simply point out that it is not obviously so—not, for instance, in the way that transitivity of 
preference has seemed to be. And if IA is not platitudinous, then neither is GT. 
 
Our two counterexamples show that GT rests on controversial assumptions (i) about 
observation and (ii) about practical rationality. This is puzzling. We said at the outset that ‘look 
for free before you leap’ seems platitudinous. Should we conclude that this is just wrong?—
That in fact our confidence in this ‘platitude’ should not exceed our confidence in the highly 
unobvious assumptions (i) and (ii)? 
The straight answer must be ‘yes’. Even when looking is free, looking before leaping 
is not a platitudinously good idea. It may not be a good idea at all. But we can give a less 
disappointing, if less straight, answer by showing how to approximate the ‘platitude’ whilst 
avoiding the questionable assumptions that underlie it. 
 
 
5 Conditionality 
 
There is a platitude that avoids the counterexamples whilst capturing something of the intuitive 
content of GT. Section 5.1 states and proves the claim, which we call ‘Conditionality’. 5.2 
shows how Conditionality avoids the difficulties facing GT, and that GT is a special case of 
Conditionality in the kind of environment that Good (mistakenly) took for granted.  
 
5.1 The Principle 
 
                                                        
27 (Hedden [2013]). 
28 See (Buchak [2010], pp. 99-100). Thanks to a referee. Buchak also suggests that we can explain the oddness of 
avoiding free evidence by saying that it is irrational from an epistemic perspective; (Campbell-Moore and Salow 
[unpublished]) argue that we cannot say this if we accept rational risk-avoidance. 
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First, note that we can represent a question as a partition of W, the elements of the partition 
being its possible (complete) answers.29 ‘Who came to the party?’ can be represented as the 
partition containing ‘No one’, ‘Only John’, ‘Only Mary’, ‘John and Mary and no one else’, etc. 
Moreover, for every partition, there is a corresponding question (‘Which element of this 
partition is actual?’); so we can move freely between the two ways of talking. In these terms, 
our platitude is:   
 
Conditionality (C): A rational agent will make her action depend on the (true) 
answer to any question, whenever she can freely do so.   
 
What does it mean to make your action depend on the answer to a question? Suppose you 
expect to choose from menu M, consisting, say, of (H) a bet on heads and (T) a bet on tails on 
the next toss of this (possibly biased) coin. Then to make your decision depend on Q—say, 
whether it rains tomorrow—is to choose instead from the menu MQ, consisting of all the ways 
for the choice from M to depend on the answer to Q. In our example these are: (HH) Bet on 
heads if rain, bet on heads if no rain; (HT) Bet on heads if rain, bet on tails if no rain; (TH) Bet 
on tails if rain, bet on heads if no rain; (TT) Bet on tails if rain, bet on tails if no rain. So 
Conditionality says that you are ex ante better off choosing from this second menu. 
 Note that ‘making her action depend on the answer to a question’ means choosing from 
all the ways in which the action can depend on the answer. In particular, it includes vacuous 
dependence: realization of the same option given any answer. (HH) and (TT) illustrate such 
vacuous dependence. Allowing for this is what makes C platitudinous. 
 Note also that C does not require that the agent be in a position ever to learn the answer 
to the question, let alone before choosing. C only tells her to employ some (free) mechanism 
that makes the option realized dependent on the answer. This needn’t involve checking for 
herself what that answer is. For instance, suppose you can use a computer to place your bet; 
you can program the computer to make the bet dependent however you like on some condition 
to which the computer is sensitive but which you cannot observe and might never learn—say, 
the material composition of the coin. C advises you to use the computer (whereas GT is silent 
on this).  
This illustrates that C, unlike GT, is not especially about observing or learning before 
acting. It deals with a more basic activity: making one’s act depend (optimally) on how the 
world is (in some respect). Intuitively, learning before deciding is a way to achieve such 
dependence—and as we’ll see, GT follows from C when it is. But as we’ll also see, learning is 
not a way to achieve such dependence in our counterexamples; that’s why GT can fail there. 
Because C isn’t about learning, its restriction to questions (= partitions) isn’t justified 
by a theory of learning. Instead it rests on the observation that a conditional act is ill-defined 
unless specifiable relative to a partition—a set of subsets of W that are disjoint and jointly 
exhaustive. If the conditions are not disjoint, the conditional act could make impossible 
demands: the conditional act of buying this car if it is Japanese but not if it is a four-wheel 
drive cannot be realized if the car is a Toyota Land Cruiser. If they are not exhaustive, the 
conditional act may specify no prize, for instance if the car is a Citroen 2CV. C’s focus on 
partitions flows from the nature of acts, independently of issues about learning. 
 So much for what C says; on to its proof. Its mathematical basis is this principle, which 
is trivial when Y is finite: 
 
Principle of Maximization (PM): If 𝑋 ⊆ 𝑌 and 𝑉: 𝑌 → ℝ is a function then 
maxQ∈R𝑉(𝑋) ≤ maxS∈T𝑉(𝑌) 
                                                        
29 (Hamblin [1958]). 
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We informally sketch the route from PM to C. If you can make the option realized from M 
dependent as you like on the answer to Q, then you can make it vacuously dependent: so 
everything in M is available if conditionalization is available. So by PM, the conditional option 
that maximizes whatever you care about (for instance, EU) does at least as well as any that 
maximizes it in M. If Alice can choose whichever of {HH, HT, TH, TT} maximizes her 
expected utility, she will do at least as well (ex ante in expectation) as when choosing from {H, 
T}, because the former set includes the latter. 
 Now a formal argument. We first prove the formal version of C: 
 
Formal Conditionality (FC): Suppose a finite menu M of acts such that each 𝑎 ∈𝑀 takes each h in some partition H of W to an outcome 𝑎(ℎ) = 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍. Let Q be 
an arbitrary question. Let 𝐹 = 𝑀 be the set of all functions from Q to M and for 
any 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 and 𝑝 ∈ 𝑄	let	𝑓Bbe the act f (p). Define M* to be the following set: 
 𝑎 ∈ A∃𝑓 ∈ 𝐹	∀𝑤 ∈ W	∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑄	∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻:𝑤 ∈ 𝑝 ∩ ℎ → 𝑎(𝑤) = 𝑓B(ℎ). 
 
Then for any function 𝑉:𝐴 → ℝ, max:∈;𝑉(𝑎) ≤ max:∈;∗𝑉(𝑎). 
 
Proof: we need to show that (i) M* exists and is a set of acts; (ii) that for any V, max:∈;𝑉(𝑎) ≤
max:∈;∗𝑉(𝑎). (i) Since H and Q both partition W, so does 𝐻⊗𝑄 =def. {ℎ ∩ 𝑝|ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑝 ∈ 𝑄}. 
Hence any w Î W lies in exactly one element of 𝐻⊗𝑄. So M* is well-defined and its elements 
are all functions from W to Z i.e. acts. (ii) For any a Î M consider the function 𝑓::𝑄 → 𝑀 
defined as follows: 𝑓:(𝑝) = 𝑎. Then 𝑓: ∈ F and if h Î H then 𝑓B:(ℎ) = 	𝑎(ℎ) = 𝑎(𝑤). So 𝑎 ∈𝑀∗. Therefore 𝑀 ⊆ 𝑀∗. Since M is finite, so is M*. So PM applies to yield the result.       
 To get from FC to C we need this decision-theoretic assumption: 
 
Representability (R): ! is representable, i.e. ! is asymmetric and ! is transitive.  
 
If R holds and A is denumerable (which we assume), then some value function V from acts to 
real numbers satisfies the following condition: for any 𝑎, 𝑎: 𝑎 ≻ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑉(𝑎) > 𝑉(𝑎).30 By 
FC, we know that if the agent faces M then for any question Q, maximizing V on MQ—that is, 
making the option realized from M optimally dependent on the answer to Q—attains at least 
as high a V-score as maximizing V on M. By R, the agent is doing at least as well in the former 
case as in the latter, by her own lights ex ante.  
 The only substantial assumption here was Representability. This fragment of classical 
decision theory is far less demanding than that necessary for GT. We have already seen that 
the latter involves IA, which many decision theories reject. But most of these non-classical 
decision theories still endorse R.31  
 Conditionality is therefore platitudinous and relatively weak. Platitudinous because the 
mathematical idea behind it is—notwithstanding the tedium of FC itself—the utterly simple 
idea that a function attains a (weakly) greater maximum over a finite set than over any of its 
subsets. Weak because the decision-theoretic idea behind it—Representability—is widely 
accepted and intuitively quite plausible. It is not universally accepted. So Conditionality itself 
                                                        
30 For proof see (Kreps [1988], ch. 3). 
31 This includes Anticipated Utility Theory, Choquet Expected Utility, Risk-Weighted Expected Utility, and 
Counterfactual Desirability Theory, but not Disappointment Theory (see n. 21).  
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is not a complete triviality. Someone who rejects R might perhaps reject C.32 But C should 
appeal more widely than any principle that prohibits the Allais preferences. 
 
5.2 Revisiting the counterexamples 
 
Neither of our two examples conflicts with C. It’s tempting to think they must because they 
conflict with GT, and GT seems to follow from C. Roughly, this is because it seems that 
observing and then deciding is always a way to make one’s decision depend optimally on the 
answer to a question.  
More carefully, suppose that a rational agent is choosing from M, and has the 
opportunity to conduct an observation. It’s tempting to accept: 
 
Questions: Any observation can be thought of as providing the complete answer 
to some (antecedently specifiable) question. 
  
So let Q be the question which the observation would answer. By C, our agent prefers choosing 
from MQ instead of M. It is also perhaps natural to think 
 
Equivalence (E): For a rational agent, choosing from M after learning the answer 
to Q is equivalent to (leads to the same outcome as33) choosing from MQ. 
 
Putting these together, it follows that our agent prefers choosing from M after learning the 
answer to Q over choosing from M. Since choosing from M after learning the answer to Q is 
just what it is to look first, our agent prefers looking before leaping. 
So GT follows from C given initially plausible principles. Nonetheless, neither of our 
examples conflicts with C. For, as we’re about to show, each of the examples conflicts with a 
different premise in this derivation. 
 
5.2.1 The Unmarked Clock 
 
The unmarked clock resists the slide from C to GT by being a counterexample to Questions: 
there is no question such that looking at the clock guarantees that you learn exactly the 
complete answer to it. Some things you might learn are consistent with others. So the things 
you might learn don’t partition W. So they aren’t all complete answers to a single question. 
 Note that looking is, even here, a way to make your decision depend on the answer to 
some question or other. Let qi be the proposition that you learn [𝑖 − 1] ∪ [𝑖] ∪ [𝑖 + 1]. Then 𝑄 = {𝑞r|0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 59} is a question, and which post-glance option you choose depends on its 
answer: you bet ODD if the answer is qi for even i, and EVEN if the answer is qi for odd i. But 
this dependence is not optimal ex ante: it differs from the pattern ‘bet ODD if the answer is qi 
for odd i, bet EVEN if the answer is qi for even i’, which is obviously what you’d choose if 
allowed to make your bet depend optimally on the answer to Q. But this non-optimality is 
                                                        
32 For alleged counterexamples to the transitivity of ! and hence (given asymmetry of !) to that of !, see (May 
[1954], pp. 6-7; Gehrlein and Fishburn [1976], p. 1). Decision theories employing imprecise probabilities may 
reject the transitivity of ! while accepting that of !. For they may allow incomparable options; and if a is 
incomparable to both b and c, yet b is preferable to c, we have c ! a and a ! b without c ! b. Many working on 
imprecise decision theories nonetheless maintain that if it’s unacceptable to choose a from 𝑀, it must also be 
unacceptable to choose a from any 𝑀’ ⊇ 𝑀 – see e.g. Axiom 1a in (Seidenfeld et al. [2010], p. 164). C follows 
straightforwardly from this – and hence appeals even to some who reject R. 
33 Or at least the same up to indifference given the answer.  
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unsurprising: why should looking at the clock make your bet optimally dependent on the 
answer to Q, when it doesn’t teach you that answer? 
 The unmarked clock would refute C only if looking at the clock, then doing what you 
think best, were equivalent to choosing an ex ante optimal pattern of dependence of your choice 
on the answer to some Q. But it can’t be. For as we argued, looking at the clock, and then doing 
what you think best, means betting ODD (EVEN) if D is even (odd), hence a sure loss. Yet one 
initial option was not to bet, which is strictly better. So for every Q, the (vacuous) pattern of 
dependence ‘take no bet whatever the answer to Q’ is preferable to looking and then doing 
what you think best. So the latter compound action can’t generate an ex ante optimal pattern of 
dependence on Q. C is safe from the unmarked clock. 
 
5.2.2 Allais 
 
C is also safe from the Allais case. Suppose a subject prefers a1 to a2 and a4 to a3, and she 
actually faces the choice (i) between 𝑎1 and a2. Intuitively, C says that she is no worse off by 
her own lights if she now makes the final selection dependent on which of ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1 and ℎU is 
true in whatever way now seems optimal to her. Inspection of the payoffs shows that she will 
choose the (vacuously) dependent act from {𝑎/, 𝑎1}{+∪+l,+} that realizes a1 in either 
circumstance. Similarly, suppose she faces the choice (ii) between a3 and a4. If choosing from 
the conditional acts, she will now choose the dependent act that realizes a4 in either case. The 
important point is that in (i) and (ii), these dependent acts make her no worse off by her own 
lights ex ante. So C is consistent with the Allais preferences. By contrast and as we saw, GT is 
not. Given the Allais preferences a1 ! a2 and a4 ! a3, it must hold either in (i) or in (ii) that 
choosing after learning which of ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1 and ℎU is true must make her worse off by her own 
lights ex ante.34   
 Returning one more time to the taxation analogy: suppose again that every US citizen 
resides in Alabama or Wyoming (not both), with those in h1 or h2 resident in Alabama and 
those in h3 resident in Wyoming, and that the tax regimes a1-a4 affect these classes as in Table 
3. Then C says only that a government choosing from a1 and a2 is rational to make the regime 
faced by a citizen somehow dependent on the citizen’s State of residence. This is consistent 
with the government’s having distributional aims that make it prefer a4 to a3. It is consistent 
with C that the government prefers a1-in-Alabama-and-a1-in-Wyoming to a2 but also a4-in-
Alabama-and-a4-in-Wyoming to a3, because each preferred system represents some way of 
making the tax regime conditional on the State of residence, which is all that C recommends.      
More formally: C implies that anyone facing M12 (M34) is (by her own lights ex ante) 
no worse off when choosing from the menu of dependent acts M12Q (M34Q), where Q is the 
question whether h3 (as opposed to ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1) is true. That is trivial, since choosing from M12 
(M34) is the same as choosing from M12Q (M34Q). For the options in M12 are a1 and a2 while the 
options in M12Q are (in an obvious notation): 
 
(i) ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1 → 𝑎/, ℎU → 𝑎/ 
(ii) ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1 → 𝑎/, ℎU → 𝑎1 
(iii) ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1 → 𝑎1, ℎU → 𝑎/ 
(iv) ℎ/ ∪ ℎ1 → 𝑎1, ℎU → 𝑎1 
 
                                                        
34 But C does not itself counsel the agent to (pay to) avoid free evidence in Allais-type cases. Allais-type agents 
will indeed do that, and this may be objectionable (see the discussion towards the end of section 4). But this is a 
consequence of their preferences, not a consequence of C itself, which is entirely consistent with IA. C, like 
transitivity, no more mandates the Allais preferences than it prohibits them.  
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Since options are functions from possible worlds to prizes, and a1 and a2 have identical prizes 
throughout h3, we may identify (i) with (ii) and (iii) with (iv). Clearly (i) is equivalent to a1 and 
(iv) to a2. So M12Q collapses into M12. Similarly M34Q collapses into M34.  
So C holds in the Allais example. Since the observation does exactly and completely 
answer the question whether h3 is true, the relevant instance of Questions also holds. So the 
Allais case must be a counterexample to E, the principle that for an agent who acts rationally, 
choosing from M after learning the answer to Q yields the same result as choosing from MQ. 
And this is exactly what we found. When the agent learns the answer to Q before choosing, she 
is liable to pick options from M = MQ that she initially rejects.35  
So neither counterexample to GT threatens C, supporting our claim that C is 
platitudinous. We’ve also seen how to derive GT from C using the initially plausible, but on 
reflection non-obvious, principles Questions and Equivalence, thus revealing the sense in 
which Good’s Theorem is the special case of Conditionality that we get whenever those 
controversial principles do in fact hold.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Good’s paper began with Ayer’s question: ‘why, in the theory of logical probability 
(credibility) we should bother to make new observations’.36 GT answers that observation pays 
when its cost is negligible. We’ve shown: first, that it need not pay unless (i) observation is 
partitional and (ii) rational choice respects Independence—neither of which is obvious. But 
second, that Conditionality holds irrespective of these assumptions, requiring only that 
preference be representable. ‘Look before you leap’ blends assumptions about perceptual 
epistemology and decision theory, making it only questionably true and clearly not 
platitudinous. ‘Make your actions depend on the world when you can’ incurs a lighter, purely 
decision-theoretic commitment that gives it, in our view, a better claim to being both.  
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